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Arguing for Equality 
Kai Nielsen 
I 
It is often argued that equality and liberty frequently conflict, that we 
must make trade-offs between equality and liberty and, particularly if 
we prize the having of a free and democratic society, that we will not 
try to achieve an equality of condition between human beings. By 
contrast, I shall argue that for there to be a free society there must be 
an extensive equality of condition. It is also the case - or so I shall 
argue - that to represent perspicuously that equality of condition we 
should articulate egalitarian principles of justice that are even more 
egalitarian than those of either John Rawls or Ronald Dworkin. It is 
in the articulation of such principles and such a conception of equal­
ity of condition that the core of my radical egalitarianism is to be 
found. 
Until rather recently, when a new spirit of meanness has come to 
reign in the name of economic rationality, there has been in the capi­
talist democracies a rather widespread belief that equality is a good 
thing, though this has been accompanied by a considerable unclarity 
as to what this equality should come to. We might start to smoke this 
out if we ask how much equality is enough. In societies such as ours, 
now, though surely not at all times in the past, we believe, even if we 
are anti-egalitarians, in moral equality. We believe, that is, that the life 
of everyone matters and matters equally. We are quite aware that 
people are of rather different moral and intellectual capacities and that 
they make quite variable inputs into their societies, yet all of that 
notwithstanding, we take it to be the case that people are of equal 
moral worth. This comes to a commitment to an equal protection of 
people's rights and to a belief that the satisfaction of their interests 
matters and matters equally. We need rather special reasons for put­
ting the interests of one person ahead of another. There can, of 
course, be such special reasons. On a lifeboat we may give priority to 
some of the interests of the one person who can navigate because by 
doing so the interests of everyone (where 'everyone• is taken collec­
tively) will be enhanced. We might, to keep him from delerium, give 
him more rations than someone else and that might conceivably mean 
that he might survive when the other person or persons might not. 
Still, we sometimes must make such hard choices. The situations 
where we must do so are situations where, starting out from an equal 
consideration of interests, we come to acknowledge that certain harsh 
conditions obtain where the interests of everyone cannot be equally 
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met, and where, if we do not make such special arrangements, the 
interests of everyone wiU be at considerable risk. In such contexts, in 
the collective interests of everyone involved, we must make some 
hard choices. It is a hard saying but a true one that numbers count. 
But that does not mean that anyone is simply morally expendable. If, 
in a particular circumstance, the interests of someone must be over­
ridden that does not mean that, morally speaking, we can start out by 
simply ignoring his interests. Overriding his interests is something 
which is prima facie wrong. We must show that overriding his inter­
ests in some particular situation is a moral necessity. 
Radical egalitarians, along with many others, believe in moral equal­
ity, but that for radical egalitarians, as well as for liberal egalitarians, 
such as John Rawls and Ronald Dworkin, is not enough. What we 
must aim at, and this can only be reasonably achieved in conditions of 
material abundance, is an equality of whole life prospects for every­
one, where that is not read simply as the right w compete for scarce 
positions of advantage but where there is brought into being social 
structures that would provide everyone equally, as far as possible, 
with the resources and the social conditions to satisfy their needs as 
fully as possible in a way that is compatible with everyone else doing 
likewise. Beyond that, as a heuristic ideal for a society of wondrous 
abundance, we should seek to provide everyone equally, as far as pos­
sible, with the resources and social conditions to satisfy each one's 
wants as fully as possible compatible with everyone receiving the same 
treatment. In seeking to establish an equality of condition, we start 
with basic needs, move out to other needs and finally move to wants 
as the productive power of the society increases. The ideal to aim at, 
perhaps only as a heuristic, is a world in which there is the full and 
equal meeting of the needs and wants of everyone. (If there is no way 
of ascertaining either then we should stick with equal resources hop­
ing that will give us what we would want if we could ascertain it.) It is 
when we have that much equality that we finally have enough equal­
ity. It is a yardstick by which we can measure the approximation to 
moral adequacy in our actual societies and see the direction in which 
we should try to go as the social wealth in the society increases or 
more accurately as the capacity for greater social wealth increases with 
the development of the forces of production. 
II 
I think in arguing as I have there is no avoiding an appeal to consi­
dered judgments. But this is not an appeal to 'intuitions' neat, for we 
can and should get them into wide reflective equilibrium.1 We can, 
that is, get our varied considered judgments into patterns of coher­
ence, squaring particular moral judgments with more general moral 
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judgments, moral principles, moral theories and background social 
theories (including, of course, empirically validated social theories). 
We would do well, in establishing such coherence patterns, to start 
with the formal principle of justice that we must treat like cases alike. 
It does not, of course, tell us uihat are like cases but we will, no matter 
who we are, if we have any sense at all, want a life in which our needs 
are satisfied and in which we can live as we wish. We plainly do differ 
in many ways, but we do not differ in wanting our needs satisfied or 
differ in desiring to be able to live as we wish. Thus, ceterus paribus, 
where questions of desert, entitlement and the like do not impinge, it 
is only fair that all of us should have our needs equally considered 
and that we should all be able to do as we wish in a way that is com­
patible with others doing likewise. From the formal principle of jus­
tice and a few key facts about us, we can get to the claim that we 
should go for the equality of condition I have characterized. That is, 
ceteTUS paribus, our basic needs should all be equally satisfied and our 
other needs and wants, as far as is feasible, should also be satisfied as 
far as that is compatible with the needs of everyone being similarly 
met. Where needs conflict with wants needs come first and where 
basic needs conflict with non-basic needs the basic needs trump the 
non-basic needs. Where these priority relations are being observed, 
we should seek the bringing about of those social structures that make 
possible the satisfaction of the most extensive system, where everyone 
is considered, of compatible needs (basic and non-basic) and wants 
that it is possible to achieve. 
Such a conception of equality takes distinctive principles of justice. 
I think the following is a perspicuous way of stating them. 
( 1) Each person is to have an equal right to the 
most extensive total system of equal basic liber­
ties and opportunities {including equal oppor­
tunities for meaningful work, for self­
determination and political and economic 
participation) compatible with a similar treat­
ment of all. {This principle gives expression to 
a commitment to attain and/ or sustain equal 
moral autonomy and equal self-respect.) 
(2) After provisions are made for common social 
(community) values, for capital overhead to 
preserve the society's productive capacity, 
allowances made for differing unmanipulated 
needs and preferences, and due weight is given 
to the just entitlements of individuals, the 
income and wealth (the common stock of 
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means) is to be so divided that each person will 
have a right to an equal share. The necessary 
burdens requisite to enhance human well being 
are also to be equally shared, subject, of course, 
to limitations by differing abilities and differing 
situations. (Here I refer to different natural 
environments and the like and not to class 
position and the like.) 
These principles of egalitarian justice specify, in a very general way, 
rights people have and duties they have under conditions of very con, 
siderable productive abundance. We have a right to certain basic lib­
erties and opportunities and we have, subject to certain limitations 
spelled out in the second principle, a right to an equal share of the 
income and wealth in the world. Similarly, again subject to the quali­
fications specified in the second principle, we have a duty to do our 
equal share in shouldering the burdens necessary to protect society at 
large from ills and to enhance the well-being of people in society. 
Ill 
I have been operating with the deep underlying principle that every­
one's life matters and indeed that everyone's life matters equally. It is 
a trivial corollary of this that the protection of everyone's genuine 
interests is of equal importance. I do not know how to prove such a 
deep underlying moral principle, a principle shared in common by a 
liberal egalitarian account of morality such as Rawls' or Dworkin's 
and a socialist one such as my own. Neither the aristocratic morality 
of an Aristotle nor the elitist meritocratic morality of Nietzsche would 
accept it. They accepted the formal principle of justice but they both 
thought that there were quite different kinds of human beings and 
that, as Nietzsche put it, it would be the very termination of justice to 
treat unequals as if they were equals. People, they believed, were 
plainly not of equal moral worth. 
Something can be said by way of response by pointing out that elit­
ists ignore the depth of socialization of people. They ignore how much 
different environments and different circumstances produce different 
people. Still, when all this has been said, and thoroughly taken to 
heart, it remains the case that there are people in similar circumstan­
ces and sometimes even of similar genetic makeup (such as twins) 
who act in very different ways and who have very different moral sen­
sitivities. Some, through their deliberate choices, contribute far more 
to their society than others, and some take much more, while giving 
less than others, and it seems to many at least only fair to reward such 
people in different ways. I think, except as a pragmatic matter, we will 
be less inclined to do that when we fully take to heart the facts of 
5
Nielsen: Arguing for Equality
Published by Digital Commons @Brockport, 1986
Arguing for Equalir;-• 9 
genetic roulette . .:! But that aside, my second principle of justice does 
allow, within severely circumscribed limits space for different indi­
vidual entitlements. Still, faced with a Nie�...schean elitist who, even 
with the above clarifications, refuses to accept the equal moral worth 
of all human beings, there is little that is not question begging that we 
can say. Here we may have hit variable bedrock considered judgments 
and it may even be the case that there are different core considered 
judgments that coherently go into different reflective equilibria. 
Egalitarians, to go to an even deeper level, will have a pro-attitude 
of impartial caring for all people, the least of us as well as the greatest 
of us. It is not evident that we can argue or reason a person into such 
an attitude, or even into seeing such an attitude to be appropriate, if 
she doesn't already have it. The Welcgeist in our societies, at least as a 
public stance, favors it but the W eltgeist has been different in the past 
and may change again. What we can say is this: it is very difficult, to 
put it minimally, for the elitist to make out a case for the intrinsic or 
inherent moral superiority of one person over another and there are 
the vital social facts, cutting against elitism, of different enculturation 
and environment as well as the fact that it hardly even makes sense to 
say that we are responsible for our genetic inheritance. 
IV 
For those of us who are prepared to accept something like the method 
of wide reflective equilibrium and who have roughly modernist atti­
tudes, there will be an acceptance of moral equality. Given such an 
acceptance, it is not unlikely that we would accept something like the 
principle that everyone's life matters and that everyone's life matters 
equally. From there we can move, by tolerably natural steps, and, I 
hope, not invalid steps, to my principles of radical egalitarian justice 
and to my substantive reading of equality of condition. 
Both liberal egalitarians and radical egalitarians will accept the prin­
ciple that everyone's life matters and matters equally. The principal 
difference between them comes over an interpretation of what this 
would come to and over what institutional and structural arrange­
ments are necessary for anything like egalitarian conditions of life to 
be a genuine possibility. Radical egalitarians will stress the need for a 
rough equality of social wealth as necessary for an equality of condi­
tion. It is this, and not envy or a compulsive desire that everything be 
divided up exactly equally, that is part of the justification for such a 
stress on equality of wealth. Though it is also the case that the result 
of reflection on what fairness comes to here, particularly when we 
reflect on whole life prospects, also provides us with a rationale for 
such an emphasis on equality of wealth. More instrumentally, and 
perhaps more securely, there is, as a further rationale for such an egal-
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itarian belief, the belief that a rough equality of social wealth is essen, 
rial to avoid those hierarchies of power that give a few control over 
the Lives of many others and will in turn lead to privileges and the like 
which will make the whole life prospects of a not inconsiderable 
number of people very different indeed. Even within a liberal capital, 
ist welfare state, to say nothing of a state run on monetarist policies, 
there is no way of attaining anything like that. Socialism is a necessary 
but perhaps not a sufficient, condition for attaining equality of 
condition. 
I have, among other things, tried to state the conditions which 
would make stably possible human flourishing, including conditions 
supporting the sustaining of self,respect for everyone. (Like Rawls, I 
give self,respect a very central place in my firmament of values.) It is, 
however, natural to query would not such an equality of condition 
undermine self,respect in another way? People would not be rewarded 
for excelling, there would, some might say, be no recognition, in my 
conception of things, of genuine contributions to society. Those who 
enrich our social and cultural life would be unrewarded and 
unacknowledged. 
My reply is that not all rewards or acknowledgement of merit need 
be monetary awards or rewards in terms of what in effect is greater 
power over the lives of others. The latter is plainly morally offensive 
in a democratic society and, in a society of great material abundance, 
which is the only kind of society in which my principles are meant to 
be more than heuristic ideals, principles of marginal utility, where 
wealth is disassociated from power (assuming for the moment that is 
possible), will undermine the prime value of greater financial reward. 
But, it is important to recognize, these are not the only kind of 
rewards there are. There is the reward of more interesting work in a 
more interesting environment; there is the reward of the public recog, 
nition of ability and the respect shown by one's fellows that goes with 
accomplishment. 
The very idea of what it is to be an egalitarian, liberal or radical, 
commits one to a moral point of view in which the interests of all the 
members of the human community matter and matter equally. But 
where there is not something reasonably approximating an equality of 
result or condition, it cannot be the case that the members of the 
human community are being so treated such that their interests matter 
equally. Without that equality of condition some will come to have 
power and control over others and the very possibility of equal 
human flourishing will be undermined. Moreover, without an equality 
of condition we cannot have free societies where there is any extensive 
flourishing of liberty. What we will have instead is liberty for a few at 
the expense of a very diminished liberty for the many. 3 
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There is an objection to what I have said that is both natural and not 
without considerable force. It could go as follows: 
The theory and its underlying principles are set out 
so briefly, in such general terms, and with such an 
important proviso ( abundance of resources) that 
they might turn out to mean anything at all. For 
example, the second principle of justice says, in part, 
"After provisions are made for common social 
values . .. and due weight is given to the just entitle­
ments of individuals", each person has a right to an 
equal share in what is left. But, what, the objection 
runs, if the common social values reward productiv­
ity with income, so that workers in high productivity 
industries earn a lot and craftsmen earn only a little? 
What if the just entitlements of individuals are con­
sidered to be so strong as to override the residual 
claim to equal distribution? That principle could, in 
practice, turn out to support almost any system of 
ownership and distribution at all. 
My two principles, if they are not to suffer from such a debilitating 
indeterminacy, must be given a determinate reading in an egalitarian 
environment or cultural ambience. If that determination is not done 
clearly and in some detail and if that environment is not morally attrac­
tive or cannot be made so by reflective discussion then such principles 
of j ustice will be revealed to be at best useless platitudes. Indeed, in 
defense of their use, something stronger would have to be said and to 
be made out, namely that this morally attractive view would have to 
be shown not to be j ust one morally attractive view among others but 
that, when various moral views were compared, it would be seen to be 
the most attractive view. This, of course, would take a not inconsider­
able amount of showing. What I have argued in the previous sections 
is meant to be a start. I think if we begin with a common conception 
of moral equality, a conception that even such severely modernist anti­
egalitarians as Robert Nozick and Antony Flew accept, as well as 
contemporary elitist perfectionists, and we couple this with a firm 
acceptance of a principle of formal j ustice (treat like cases alike), we 
can move, step by step, in a plausible manner, to a more substantial 
equality and with that we can move, as a partial specification of that 
equality, to my principles of radical egalitarian j ustice. 
If we start with the belief that the life of everyone matters and mat­
ters equally such that whatever natural rights we have (if indeed there 
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are any such rights) require equal protection for all of us and that, as 
well, and relatedly, the satisfaction of the interests of all human beings 
matters and matters equally, then, under conditions of abundance, we 
will not reward productively with greater income. That commitment 
to productivity, where people are clear about the implications of 
moral equality, will not be one of their common social values. It will 
only have positive instrumental value where we need, under condi­
tions of scarcity, to develop the forces of production. 
Where conditions of reasonable abundance obtain, it would not be 
possible for an egalitarian to take it as one of the common social 
values of such a society that workers in high productivity industries 
earn a lot and craftsmen earn only a little. In a society of non­
abundance struggling to attain abundance by increasing its social 
wealth such rewards for productivity might have to be given. But this 
would be a temporary expedient in the struggle to make the springs of 
social wealth flow more fully. Such rewards for productivity could 
never be the hallmark of a just society functioning under optimum 
conditions. All sorts of contingencies, quite unlinked to natural abili­
ties, place some in jobs that are productive and some in jobs that are 
less productive. Even if we allow scope for considerations of desert, as 
I believe within severely circumscribed limits we should, there need 
be no greater desert (schedule of meritocratic rewards) for the worker 
in high productivity industries, e.g. the worker in computer industries 
over the highly skilled cabinet maker or shoemaker. There is no need 
and no justification for such discriminations to be made where we 
start from a base of moral equality and we live under conditions of 
considerable abundance. 
Similar things need to be said about my critic's point concerning 
entitlements. Whatever we might want to say about individual owner­
ship of productive property (means of production), there will, in both 
capitalist and communist societies, be private ownership of individual 
property, e.g. things like houses and cars. In a society of abundance 
but where all the same conditions were becoming rather crowded, I 
might have come to own, before conditions of extensive crowding and 
{let us agree) by some principles of just acquisition, three family 
houses: one in the city, one on the beach and another in the moun­
tains. This would, indeed, be very pleasant for me, and under condi­
tions of extensive abundance where such things would be generaly 
available for those who would avail themselves of them, there would 
certainly be nothing untoward about it. But, if in this otherwise 
abundant society, not a few wanting rather more expansive living 
conditions were actually stuck in small apartments, then my entitle­
ment to three such residences would be overridden. I have an entitle­
ment here all right - I justly acquired them - but under certain 
conditions, for an egalitarian, such entitlements, which are in place, 
9
Nielsen: Arguing for Equality
Published by Digital Commons @Brockport, 1986
Arguing for Equalit)• 13 
are rightly overridden. Such entitlements are entitlements which hold 
cer.erus paribus. But here ceterus is not paribus. But the principle itself is 
not going to tell me when ceterus is paribus or else there would be no 
need for such a qualifier in the first place. 
Where we start from a basis of moral equality which would commit 
one to treating the interests of everyone as equally deserving of 
respect, we could not but, under the above circumstances, override 
those entitlements: entitlements which prima f acie must be respected. 
Even contemporary anti�galitarians accept moral equality but then it 
is difficult for me to understand how they could not but favor over­
riding such entitlements in those circumstances. There could be no 
social value for an egalitarian which would allow, for what is properly 
distributable at all, such strong entitlements: entitlements that would 
override claims to equal distribution which are essential for that 
equality of condition which in turn is essential for attaining a world of 
moral equality where the life of everyone matters and matters 
equally.4 
VI 
There is another objection by way of a query to my account which 
comes trippingly on the tongue. What exactly, or even inexactly, is 
the connection between my two principles of justice and my radical 
egalitarianism? The connection is this: the root conception that makes 
the radical egalitarian an egalitarian is the belief that everyone's life 
matters and everyone's life matters equally. When our perspective is 
an agent-neutral one, which is the decisively crucial perspective of a 
moral point of view here, the interests of all the members of the 
human community matter and matter equally. But if such a concep­
tion is to have any possibility of corning to be a reality (have a stable 
social exemplification) certain institutional arrangements, backed by 
certain norms, must come into place. It is here where my two princi­
ples of justice become relevant. The second calls for a rough equality 
of wealth. If that does not obtain there is little likelihood that there 
will be institutional structures in place that will support the egalitarian 
belief that everyone's life matters and matters equally. Without such a 
rough equality of wealth, power hierarchies will develop in societies 
which will give a few extensive control over the lives of many. Many 
people will have much less autonomy (control over their lives) than 
they would have with a greater equality of wealth. With such differen­
tial autonomy, it cannot be the case that everyone's life can matter 
equally in a social accounting of things (the agent-neutral perspective 
again). If we really believe that everyone's life matters and everyone's 
life matters equally, we must go for at least something like the equal­
ity of condition expressed in my second principle of justice. 
10
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The first principle is even more clearly linked with the idea that 
everyone's life matters and everyone's life matters equally. Given 
some reasonable security and moderate abundance, one of the things 
people will come to care about, and indeed care about very deeply, is 
control over their own lives. They will care, that is, about their auto­
nom y. They will care, and come to care more acutely, about rational 
self-direction the more security and a reasonable amount of social 
wealth become realities in their society. They will want to understand 
themselves and their world and they will want to be in control of their 
own lives. Where people are starving such talk is at best hollow and at 
worst obscene. But starting with a minimal security, and as social 
wealth and security increase, concern for autonomy becomes 
increasingly important. 
Such matters will be terribly important for all of us individually, or 
at least it would be terribly important for all of us individually, if we 
would reflect with tolerable care about our lives. If we start from the 
basis of moral eq uality, we will be very concerned to protect and 
enhance as much as possible everyone's autonomy and we will take 
this concern to be something that should be manifest in the society 
for all of us equa lly. This does not mean that in some active way each 
person will be equally concerned with everyone. If everyone were to 
show such a catholic expression of individual concern, it is very 
unlikely that there will be much concern shown for very many people.  
What we do mean to be claiming instead is that social structures 
should be maintained which function to protect and enhance the 
autonomy of everyone equally as far as that is possible. It is this con­
dition for which my first principle of justice is an action guide. 
Still someone might say that at best the above set of arguments 
shows that there is a close link between my principles of justice and 
moral equality, but not a close link between my principles of j ustice 
and my radical egalitarianism. I find this remark puzzling, for it just 
seems to me that my two principles are a partial expression of what I 
intend by 'radical egalitarianism'. They, that is, encapsulate an impor­
tant part of it and put it in the imperative mode. My radical egalitar­
ianism in its conception of an equality of condition requires, in socie­
ties of productive abundance, a rough equality of wealth and with that 
no individual will have, in any institutionalized way, and in any 
uncontrolled and non-consensual way, greater power than any other 
individual such that a class or stratum could persist with power to 
control or dominate others, making conditions for the possibility of 
equal autonomy impossible. It  is just in such a conception that my 
radical egalitarianism differs most fundamentally from liberal 
egalitarianism. 
11
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My claim that to have a free society - a society where liberty flour­
ishes - we must have a society reasonably approximating an equality 
of condition will strike not a few people as implausible. The received 
wisdom is that in a free society we must make trade-offs between 
freedom and equality and that a society which was thoroughly egali­
tarian would undermine freedom. We can see that this is so, it is 
claimed, if we reflect on an institution like marriage. Suppose both A 
and B want to marry C but that they live in a monogamous society 
such that A and B cannot both simultaneously marry C. If C marries 
A then A and B cannot be in an equality of condition. But in a society 
which at all values freedom we must allow individual choice here and 
with it an inevitable inequality of result. Indeed, in a monogamous 
society, whether it respects individual choice or not, there must be an 
inequality of result in such a situation. But here the distinctive struc­
tures of the inequality will be the result of people making individual 
choices. 
There is something very strange here. To talk about equality or 
inequality here is zany. No egalitarian - or at least no egalitarian of 
any note - ever thought to talk about equality here or to relate such 
matters to equality of condition. It was various political, legal and 
dvil equalities that were first demanded, then, with the increased 
development of the productive forces and an increased democratiza­
tion of society, things like equal health care, equal educational oppor­
tunities and equal social benefits generally, along with the acceptance 
of burdens, equally to be shared, necessary for the common good, 
became further demands or at least were set forth as ideals to be 
achieved when the springs of social wealth came to flow even more 
freely and fully. And finally economic equality, that is demands for a 
democratic control of the means of production, came on stream. But 
things like 'equality in marriage partners' never came on the horizon. 
Indeed, such a conceptualization does not even have any clear sense. 
Still, it is not implausible to counter, if C marries A then A gets 
what A wants while B does not, so clearly there is not an equality of 
condition between A and B. But it is at an equality of condition that 
radical egalitarianism aims. The marriage thing shows, the argument 
goes, that it either cannot be attained at all or that it canonot be 
attained in a way which is even remotely acceptable to those who 
respect freedom of choice. 5 If the latter is so, then, after all, to protect 
liberty, we must make some trade-offs with equality. To achieve 
equality of condition here would come to an undermining of liberty 
and would not show respect for persons. 
In morality 'ought implies can'. We cannot rightly or even coher­
ently tell someone that they ought to do something unless they can do 
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it. What I think needs to be said, to counter the above objection, is 
that we cannot possibly achieve equality of condition here. So that to 
say that we ought to try to do so makes no sense. There is no possibil­
ity of these 'egalitarian marriage arrangements' coming into being and 
thus their becoming destructive of liberty makes no sense. Should we 
cut C in half and A could marry one half and B the other? C cannot 
be divided like a pie. Or perhaps A should marry C for ten years and 
B should then marry C for the next ten years or, since they might take 
the order to be important, perhaps they should draw straws for who 
is to get the first ten years. (If that sounds obscene it is because it is 
obscene.) There are a number of other permutations and combina­
tions possible, but they are all plainly equally unacceptable, if people's 
considered judgements are to be given any weight. Neither A, B nor C 
would think that any of these various possible arrangements made for 
the attainment of an equality of condition and they would, given our 
actual moral sensitivities, in other ways be unhappily held. The short 
of it is that there no achieving an equality of condition here. Such talk 
just barely makes sense and that is at least one of the reasons why the 
'attaining of such equalities' has never been on the egalitarian agenda. 
(Perhaps it makes conceptual sense but not moral sense? If that is so, 
do not such considerations, after all, count against egalitarianism?) 
It perhaps should be said again, in the face of anti-egalitarian intran­
sigence here, that the equality of condition sought is not such that it 
would lead to human uniformity - not everyone wants to paint, play 
hockey, philosophize or be a cabinet maker, not would all of these 
things be fulfilling for everyone.6 What equality of condition aims at 
is setting the conditions, perhaps mainly by making equal resources 
available, such that it would be possible for everyone, if they were 
capable of it, to enjoy an equally worthwhile and satisfying life or at 
least a life in which, for all of them, as far as possible, their needs 
would be met and met equally, even where they are not the same 
needs, and, after that, where their needs are met, their wants are to be 
met as well and met equally where this is possible. There is the hope 
here to approximate an equality of well-being where that equality is 
not purchased by lowering the well-being of some, capable of a greater 
well being, to compensate those capable of less, but to seek to develop 
social structures which would help each person to attain the most 
complete well-being of which that person is capable, compatible with 
everyone, in the respect being considered, being treated in the same 
manner. 
VIII 
It is indeed difficult to give a satisfactory conceptualization of the 
notions of equality of well-being or equality of condition. 7 I think 
13
Nielsen: Arguing for Equality
Published by Digital Commons @Brockport, 1986
Arguing for Equality 17 
here in talking of these conceptions a very important point is made by 
Richard Norman which may be of practical moral import, given the 
difficulty in getting a satisfactory conceptualization of these notions. 
Though the idea of equality of well-being, Norman remarks, may be 
"the underlying ethical priciple of egalitarianism, it is not what egalit­
arians have in practice directly aimed at. "8 Rather, egalitarians "have 
aimed at creating the social conditions which would enable people to 
enjoy worthwhile lives".9 They realiz.e that there can "be no guarantee 
that everyone will in fact achieve equal well-being, and indeed the 
expectation must be that this will never entirely happen, but what we 
can do is create the kind of society in which there will be no impedi­
ments to equal well-being, other than the accidents and vagaries of 
individual temperaments and inclinations".10 And to achieve these 
things, it is essential that we come to have equality of social power, 
equality of wealth and equality in education - all matters captured by 
my principles of justice. 
If, as J .S. Mill and Isaiah Berlin believe, we, as human beings, have 
as one of our deepest needs, the need to have some assured private 
sphere - say, freedom with respect to religious belief or sexual pref­
erence - with which no one can rightly coercively interfere, then an 
egalitarianism aimed at equality of well-being or equality of condition 
would seek for all of us, and equally, to protect the right to such 
privacy. 
IX 
Still, some would argue that in maintaining, as I would, an interde­
pendence of liberty and equality - you can't have a free society with­
out it being an egalitarian society as well - I fail to understand that a 
necessary if not a sufficient condition for people being free is that 
they cannot in these assured private spheres be compelled by others 
to act in certain ways. Insofar as people are coerced, they are indeed 
unfree. But to keep egalitarian patterns people will have to be coerced 
into doing certain things and however desirable it may be that those 
things be done, they, in being so compelled, are not acting freely. So it 
cannot be the case that a free society and an equal society coincide. 
To sustain equality we must in certain situations coercively interfere 
with people doing what they want. 
However, a free society is not a society in which people without 
restriction can do what they want but a society in which people can 
do what they want without violating the rights of others: without 
invading that assured private space in which people can do what they 
will.11 Clear instantiations of that private space are things such as 
being able to vote, not to have to go to church or synagogue if you do 
not want to, to marry whomever you please as long as that person will 
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marry you, to immigrate, t0 express your political views and the like. 
But the having of such rights will not upset patterns protecting equal, 
ity of condition. On the contrary, its being the case that everyone has 
these rights is part of what it is to achieve equality of condition. 
There willt however, be trouble if the assured private space is 
extended to private property, particularly private productive pro� 
erty. Suppose one person has a large tract of land in a society in which 
many people are landless and desperately in need of land to keep 
body and soul tOgether. Here is at least a prima farie case for redistri­
bution. But if the having of private property is a part of that assured 
private sphere, which must remain inviolate, then it looks as if, after 
all, we must make trade-offs between liberty and equality. But it is 
thoroughly problematic whether the right to private property should 
be part of such an assured private sphere Like fredom of speech. Not 
all rights have equal stringency. There are, in short, rights and rights, 
e.g. the right to bodily integrity is one thing, the unlimited right to 
acquire consumer durables is another and private productive property 
still is another. 
Still, if we have a right to private individual property at all, there 
remains, in such circumstance, some trade-0ffs to be made between 
liberty and equality in overriding such a right in certain circumstan­
ces. This, I think, the radical egalitarian has to concede. What he can 
and should add is that this only qualifies his thesis about the interde­
pendence of liberty and equality. The loss of liberty here is not the 
loss of any basic liberties - strategic vital liberties that are crucial for 
people to be able to live self-directed lives - and it is at least arguable 
that in such instances the trade-off in a loss of liberty is not just with 
equality but a trade-off of a lesser liberty, both in type of liberty and 
extent of liberty, for a greater liberty. If a huge tract of private prop­
erty is taken from a landowner and redistributed to peasants, free­
dom, everything considered, is plainly increased for more people 
come to have greater control over their lives. 
However, what about Hume's point that, if we carry out such redis­
tributions, given our cc different degrees of art, care and industry," the 
equality of condition in the society in question will be rendered 
unstable and that, to prevent such an undermining of equality, the 
state will have to impose ccthe most rigorous inquisition ... to watch 
every inequality on its first appearance ... [and] to punish and redress 
it" in such a manner that the state uauthority must soon degenerate 
into tyranny".12 But this would not be so where people were generally 
already strongly committed to equality, where they had struggled hard 
- indeed fought - to attain an egalitarian social order and wanted to 
protect this hard won achievement.13 They would not have to use the 
state apparatus to enforce an egalitarian social order, to ram it down 
the t h r o a t s  o f  an u n w i l l ing p e o p l e ,  f o r  it  i s  s o m e t h i n g  
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toward which they already have firm pro-attitudes. They would at 
most have to use the state apparatus, in a perfectly democratic 
manner, to make adjustments to which the vast majority of the citi, 
zens were already committed. That a few people in the society would 
not have such pro-attitudes would not require a reign of unfreedom 
to protect the commitment to equality. Furthermore, a redistribution 
of land, against the wishes of the few who would resist this, is not an 
invasion into an inviolate private sphere as is a redistribution of hu5' 
bands, wives, kidneys or a refusal of the right to immigrate. 
x 
Let me return to a point powerfully argued by Richard Norman - a 
point I mentioned earlier in passing.14 What radical egalitarians have 
aimed at is the creating of social conditions which would enable peo­
ple to enjoy equally worthwhile lives, where the conditions to be 
brought into exsitence would be such that they all could live, if they 
had the will to do so, very worthwhile lives.15 People are too different 
and there are too many strictly personal unforeseeable circumstances, 
for it to be very likely, even in the best of worlds, that everyone will 
in fact achieve equal well,being. That is pure utopia. But what we can 
perhaps do, and what radical egalitarians regard as deeply desirable to 
do, is to "create the kind of society in which there will be no impedi, 
ments to equal well,being other than the accidents and vagaries of 
individual temperaments and inclinations" .16 The social conditions we 
need to create to make this real are conditions where there is an equal, 
ity of social power, a rough equality of wealth and equality in educa, 
tion. What it is also necessary to recognize is that these equalities are 
principally valuable because they are strategic in attaining what my 
first principle of justice specifies as a prime desideratum, namely 
equality of liberty (if you will, conditions for equal autonomy). What 
we want is a world in which all people capable of self-direction have, 
and have equally, control over their own lives. In their concern with 
equality of social power their concern has been with the structural 
features of a society which reproduces a world in which there are clear 
class divisions giving rise to class oppression, gender divisions giving 
rise to sexual oppression and racial divisions giving rise to racial 
oppression. 17 
Class oppression is a key element in the inequality of structural 
power relations. Where one class has control of the relations of pro, 
dution, as the capitalist class does in capitalist societies, and where 
another class, without control of the means of production, or at least 
the major means of production, must sell its labour-power as a com, 
modity on the market in a situation in which capitalists and workers 
are unequal partners in the bargaining, we have a situation in which 
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the structural power relations are unequal and in which capitalists 
dominate and exploit worlcers.18 Such relations of production give 
one class pervasive power over the other. Moreover, as Norman 
points out, it isn't just that. with such control of the relations of pro­
duction. capitalists gain control over the economic life of the society, 
more than that, though they indeed do that, the power of capitalists 
over workers extends in myriad ways to the life of the society as a 
whole. They dominate the culture industry, educational structures, 
health services, and the lilce. Such relations of production, in fine, 
make for great structural inequalities of power. Liberal egalitarians, 
such as Rawls and Dworkin, set aside - effectively ignore - such 
questions about structural inequalities of power generated by capital, 
ist relations of production. But with such inequalities of power equal 
liberty and anything approaching equal well,being or any equality of 
condition is quite impossible. Radical egalitarians, by contrast, place 
such matters centre stage and argue that there can be no equality of 
social power without radically changed relations of production: rela, 
tions of production which would "consist in the common ownership 
and popular control of the means of production" . 19 And this, of 
course, means socialism. 
The morally most important inequalities of wealth are just those 
inequalities in ownership and control of the means of production that 
we have been tallcing about. But, as well, though less importantly, 
there are inequalities in wealth as means of consumption. When such 
inequalities are considerable (as they plainly are in our societies), it 
will be much more difficult to approximate an equality of well,being 
and certainly with such disparities in wealth it will, ''to understate the 
matter, make it more difficult for some than for others to enjoy a 
worthwhile life" .20 Not everyone, given individual differences, will 
live equally worthwhile lives. But a rough equality of wealth would 
help toward putting everyone "equally in a position to live such a life, 
while leaving them free to utilize the opportunities in whatever way 
they see fit".21 
In stressing equality of wealth, we must be careful not just to talk 
about equality of monetary income, for two people could have equal 
incomes and still be in a very unequal condition if one needed very 
expensive medical care that swallowed up much of his income while 
the other did not. (I am thinking here of countries like the United 
States and South Africa that do not have national health insurance.) 
That is why I spoke initially of meeting basic needs for everyone first, 
then progressing to less basic needs and finally, when all the needs 
(basic and non,basic) are met, turning to an equal consideration of 
everyone's wants. Perhaps the way of getting most equitably at a satis, 
faction of wants, after needs are met, is to meet them by instituting 
equality of incomes after allowances are made for the equal satisfac, 
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Equality in education is also a central element in attaining equality 
of condition and equal liberty for all. It is not just the having of equal, 
iry of educational opportunity, though it is the having of that. For. 
left just like that, such equality of opportunity in a hierarchical corn, 
peririve system - what Daniel Bell calls a credentials society 
-
is 
simply the equal opportunity to compete to be unequal. By contrast, 
for an egalitarian, such equal opportunity would be used to help prO' 
vide an equal opportunity to live a worthwhile life.13 The thing is to 
arrange social conditions - including educational conditions - so 
that everyone has the opportunity to live a worthwhile life. 
We need to recognize (returning to a more general stance), as Nor, 
man has stressed, that "power, wealth and education are basic sources 
of liberty".24 Egalitarians, prizing liberty and equality, take the most 
important equalities to be equality of social power, of wealth and of 
educational provision. The first principle of justice I enunciated, as 
well as Rawls's first principle of justice, could not be satisfied without 
such equalities obtaining. 
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